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1 Introduction
Mission-oriented organizations provide collective goods as education, health care, research and
defence. In such organizations, employees benefit from being personally involved in the pro-
duction process (see Besley and Ghatak, 2005). For their willingness to be of service, workers
adhering to the mission of their employers (that we will call motivated henceforth) typically
accept additional tasks and/or responsibilities with low or no pay increase. Such behaviors are
obviously beneficial for the employer. According to the labor donation theory (Preston, 1989),
motivated workers are willing to donate a portion of their paid labor. In other words, they are
ready to receive lower wages because they obtain satisfaction from the fact that their efforts
allow the achievement of socially-valuable goals. In mission-oriented organizations, volunteering
is typically an important source of labor in the form, for example, of unpaid overtime (see Gregg
et al., 2011, and Salamon et al., 2012).1 Data from the Workplace Employment Relations Study
for UK collected in 2011 show that almost the 70% of employees adhere to the organization’s
values (see Table 1). The degree to which workers’ share the values of their organization is
also positively correlated with the amount of unpaid overtime that employees donate to their
employer, thereby supporting the labor donation theory.2
Share the values of the organization Frequency Percentage Cumulative
Strongly Agree 2,934 16.12 16.12
Agree 9,146 50.26 66.38
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 4,783 26.28 92.67
Disagree 1,080 5.94 98.60
Strongly Disagree 254 1.40 100.00
Total 18,197 100.00
Table 1: Distribution of answers. Data collected from the Workplace Employment Relations
Study for the UK in 2011.
Our research question is the following: Are mission-oriented organizations still able to extract
labor donations from motivated employees when the latter are fairness concerned? Indeed, even
1Using data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), Gregg et al. (2011) show that in-
dividuals in the non-profit sector are significantly more likely to do unpaid overtime than those in the
for-profit sector. Moreover, Salamon et al. (2012) show that volunteer time accounts for about a quarter
of not-for-profit contribution to GDP on average in the seven countries studied.
2Using data from the Workplace Employment Relations Study for UK in 2011, we find that the
correlation coefficient between the amount of unpaid overtime and the employees’ mission-orientation is
equal to 0.1343.
motivated employees are concerned with and may suffer from pay inequalities possibly stemming
from workers’ heterogeneity. A recent empirical literature on fairness in the workplace shows
that employees are envious when they receive a lower net compensation, namely a lower wage
net of the cost of performing the task, than that of their colleagues and that pay inequality
among peers can be detrimental to the work atmosphere (see Card et al., 2012, and Breza
et al., 2016).3 We argue that, precisely because of their labor donations, motivated employees
may be particularly sensitive to pay inequalities. As a result, taking into account the interplay
between envy and workers’ motivation is crucial in understanding whether and to what extent
the employer can still extract labor donations from her employees.
We propose a simple model to study how fairness considerations affect both labor donations
and employment contracts in mission-oriented organizations when employees differ in their abil-
ity, that can be either high or low, and which is their private information. Screening contracts
are defined by a wage rate and an (observable) effort task, the latter corresponding, for exam-
ple, to the number of hours the employees are required to work. Since employees enjoy their
contribution to the firm’s mission, their labor donations are increasing in the effort they are
required to perform. As a result, when high-ability workers are asked to work more than their
low-ability colleagues, they offer higher labor donations. These labor donations are profitable
for the firm, but they create a gap between (net) compensations of employees.
Because of fairness concerns, the subset of workers receiving a net compensation lower than
the one of their colleagues must be rewarded with an ‘envy rent’. In addition, given that
workers’ ability is their private information, high-ability workers have to be rewarded with an
information rent. We show that, not surprisingly, high-ability workers always receive a higher
wage and a more intense task than low-ability colleagues. More interestingly, we explain how
labor donations are affected by envy rents and information rents and we derive conditions such
that it is optimal to have either the high- or the low-ability workers as the higher net earner in the
workplace. In particular, the model predicts that, in sectors where the firm’s mission (and thus
workers’ labor donation) is important and heterogeneity in ability is high, the firm optimally
designs contracts where high-ability employees receive a lower net compensation than their low-
ability colleagues. Thus, in sectors where the firm’s mission is important, optimal contracts
entail ‘envy at the top’. In contrast, in sectors where the firm’s mission is not important, we
show that the information rent paid to high-ability employees is sufficiently high to make their
3Mas (2006) also shows that being paid below a reference point has a negative impact on performance.
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net compensation relatively higher, and thus the low-ability colleagues envious. Hence, when
the firm’s mission is not important optimal contracts entail ‘envy at the bottom’.4
The intuition for our results is the following. Irrespective of the degree of her mission-
orientation, the employer has to pay an information rent to prevent high-ability employees
from mimicking their low-ability colleagues. Let us consider, first, the instance in which both
workers’ heterogeneity in ability and the firm’s mission are high. When this is the case, labor
donation from high-ability employees is high both in absolute and in relative terms. Here the
information rent paid to high-ability types is not large enough to reverse the ordering between
net compensations. In different words, labor donation from high-ability employees (net of the
information rent they receive) is still higher than the one from low-ability employees so that
high-ability types are the lower net earners and thus are envious of their low-ability colleagues:
the ‘envy at the top’ solution emerges.5 In contrast, when the firm’s mission is not important,
then labor donations are relatively low and the information rent received by high-ability types
reverses the ordering of net compensations. Now, the solution with ‘envy at the bottom’ emerges
and low-ability employees are envious of the higher net compensation received by their high-
ability colleagues.
Finally, we empirically test the predictions of our model through the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP), which contains data on workers’ fairness considerations and reliable proxies
for workers ability and for their labor donations. We show that our theoretical predictions are
supported by the data. Specifically, we find that high-ability employees always receive a higher
wage and work for a larger amount of hours than low-ability employees. However, in sectors
where labor donation is important, i.e. health care, education, and public services, high-ability
employees on average perceive their wage as less fair (and are thus more envious) than the
average of low-ability employees. The opposite evidence is observed in some sectors where labor
donation is not relevant, such as in the trade sector. Here, on average, low-ability workers
perceive their compensation as less fair than the average of their high-ability colleagues.
The remainder of the article is as follows. The related literature is discussed in the next
section. In Section 3, the setup of the model is presented. The analysis of the optimal em-
ployment contract under full information is studied in Section 4, the screening employment
4We also show that, when no one of the previous two solutions is feasible, the principal offers a
pooling contract to her employees (which implies again ‘envy at the bottom’ ).
5If workers were not sharing the organization’s mission and were not offering some labor donation
to their employer, then the solution with ‘envy at the top’ would not be possible. Indeed, given the
information rent their high-ability colleagues receive, in the absence of labor donations the low-ability
employees would necessarily be the ones who are envious.
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contract when employees’ ability is their private information is analyzed in Section 5; in Section
6 the empirical analysis is carried out and concluding remarks are provided in Section 7. All
mathematical computations and proofs of the results are in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
A recent literature studies organizations where employees derive non-monetary benefits from
undertaking some tasks or from providing some types of services (see Biglaiser and Albert Ma,
2007, Buurman et al., 2012, Dur and Zoutenbier, 2014, Cassar, 2016, and Barigozzi and Burani,
2016). The idea is that, in some sectors, workers may care about the output produced by their
organization, or about the recipients of the services they provide, i.e. their patients, students, or
customers. Considerable attention has been received by the public sector and by ‘public service
motivation’ allowing the extraction of some labor donation from bureaucrats and civil servants
(see among others Bond and Glode, 2011, Jaimovich and Rud, 2014, Francois, 2000, 2007,
Glazer, 2004, Macchiavello, 2008, and Francois and Vlassopoulos, 2008, for a survey focusing
both on the public and the non-profit sectors).
Many of the mentioned papers study the sorting of workers characterized by heterogeneous
motivation into different sectors of the labor market and its consequences for optimal pay policies
and organizational design. We study instead how the interaction between labor donations and
fairness considerations affects optimal contracts when employees differ in their ability and this
is their private information.
In addition to the empirical studies mentioned in the introduction, a recent experimental
evidence has analyzed how employees respond to fairness considerations (see Fehr and Schmidt,
2006, for an overview). Few theoretical studies have analyzed behaviors and choices of workers
who are fairness concerned. Like Desiraju and Sappington (2007), von Siemens (2011, 2012), and
Manna (2016), we consider a setting with adverse selection on some workers’ characteristic and
we assume that employees suffer a disutility whenever they feel worse off than their colleagues.
Differently from the existing literature, we derive optimal contracts when workers are fairness-
concerned and the employer is willing to maximize labor donations from motivated employees.
In this literature, our paper is most closely related to the one of Desiraju and Sappington (2007),
with which we share the idea that a worker’s payoff is measured as his/her net compensation.
However, while in Desiraju and Sappington (2007) workers are inequity averse and may be
ex-ante identical (meaning that they do not observe their ability ex-ante), in our setting they
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differ ex-ante and suffer from fairness concerns only when they are the lower net-earners in the
workplace, i.e. only envy is relevant in our setting.6
Finally, by focusing on an adverse selection problem, this paper also complements the liter-
ature that studies optimal incentive contracts when employees are motivated by fairness consid-
erations in a moral hazard setting (see among others Bartling and von Siemens, 2010, Englmaier
and Wambach, 2010, Kragl and Schmid, 2009, and Neilson and Stowe, 2010).
3 The Model
A mission-oriented employer (she) is willing to hire a unit mass of workers. We have in mind
an organization producing collective goods and services (see Besley and Ghatak, 2005), whose
market power can be justified on the ground of its specific and characterizing mission which is
valuable to prospective workers.
The mission-oriented organization offers its employees a contract that consists of a wage,
ω, and effort, e. The effort provided by each employee is contractible, i.e. it is observable
and verifiable (as, for example, the number of hours an employee is required to work), and it
is the only input the firm needs in order to produce. The firm’s production function displays
constant returns to effort so that the amount of output produced is q (e) = e, whose unit value
is normalized at 1. Such valuation can reflect the price at which the employer sells a unit of
output, the marginal benefit obtained by a manager in a non-profit organization from increasing
output, the preferences of the government when it is the producer (hence we are agnostic about
the organization’s ownership structure). The employer has the following per-worker payoff:
pi = e− ω (e) . (1)
Employees differ in their cost of exerting effort (henceforth, ability) θ, which is their private
information. There are two types of employees: high-ability workers, with θH = 1, have a low
cost of exerting effort, while low-ability workers, with θL = θ > 1, are characterized by a high
cost of exerting effort. Workers’ heterogeneity is denoted by ∆θ = θ − 1 > 0. The fraction of
high-ability employees is λ, while the fraction of low-ability employees is 1− λ, with λ ∈ (0, 1).
This information is common knowledge. Workers are risk neutral, wealth constrained, and have
6Loewenstein et al. (1989) show that individuals exhibit a strong and robust aversion against disad-
vantageous inequality. Fewer individuals also exhibit an aversion to advantageous inequality. However,
this effect seems to be significantly weaker than the aversion to disadvantageous inequality.
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a reservation wage of zero.7 The employee i’s utility is:
Ui(ei, ωi, e−i, ω−i; θi) = Ni + γei − β (max {N−i −Ni, 0}) ,
where Ni = ωi − 1
2
θie
2
i
with i = L,H, and where the subscript −i indicates the type different from i.
The employees’ utility consists of three terms.
(i) First, employees receive a net compensation Ni that is given by the difference between
the wage and the cost of exerting effort;
(ii) Second, employees obtain a premium γei for contributing to the output of the mission-
oriented firm, where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of the organization’s social mission.8,9 Such premium
increases with both the amount of effort that an employee is required to perform and the
degree of the firm’s mission. Importantly, this premium generates some labor donation from
the employees to the firm.10 Indeed, according to the labor donation theory (Preston, 1989),
employees are willing to donate a portion of their paid labor (in the form, for example, of unpaid
overtime) because they obtain satisfaction from the fact that their efforts achieve socially-
valuable goals. Given that the employees’ premium increases with the amount of labor they
provide, a crucial aspect of our model is the following: when high-ability employees are required
a larger effort than low-ability ones, the former are also willing to offer a higher labor donation
to their employer than the latter.
(iii) Finally, employees suffer a utility loss whenever they feel worse off than their colleagues.
Specifically, workers of type i are envious of their colleagues of type −i if their net compensation
Ni is relatively lower.
11 The parameter β ≥ 0 measures the employees’ level of envy towards a
7In our setting, labor donations are always feasible because the cost of effort is interpreted as the
(monetary equivalent of the) physical or psychological cost of performing a given task.
8By assuming that γ is lower than 1 we assure that workers are never volunteering, no matter the
information structure and the type of contract offered by the employer.
9The degree of the organization’s mission depends on the type of collective good or service produced.
For example, the mission of a non-profit organization providing education and health care for the poor
is perceived as more relevant than the mission of an organization providing aesthetic medicine aimed to
reducing the signs of aging.
10Given that employees’ motivation stems from the employer’s mission, applicants with the same
ability receive the same premium when hired by the mission-oriented firm.
11Notice that, to be consistent with the labor donation theory, the net compensation has been defined
as the wage paid by the employer net of the disutility loss from performing the task, 12θie
2
i , but gross
of the motivational premium stemming from the firm’s mission, γei. Think about unpaid overtime
that workers are donating to the employer because they are keen to contribute to her mission. In our
interpretation, such labor donations do not affect workers’ perception of fairness which only depends on
the relative difference between the salary and the number of paid hours appearing in contracts. In other
words, workers’ fairness concerns derive from the comparison of separating contracts (wi, ei) , i = L,H,
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higher-net-earner colleague and is common knowledge. The assumption that employees compare
their compensations is supported by social psychologists like Festinger (1962) and Adams (1963).
They argue that workers desire a fair relation between the effort required by the employer and
the offered salary.
We innovate with respect to the previous literature by studying the interaction between
workers’ fairness concerns and labor donations when the employer offers a menu of screening
contracts. Indeed, in her attempt to extract labor donations from workers of different types, the
principal is not only constrained by the employees’ concern for fairness but also by their private
information on ability. Specifically, the principal will possibly offer envy rents and information
rents to her employees which may offset their labor donation. Thus, in what follows, we will
focus on net labor donations:
Definition 1. We call net labor donation, the amount of (observable) effort that an employee is
willing to exert for free for his mission-oriented employer net of the possible rewards for fairness
concerns (envy rent) and for truthful information (information rent):
net labor donation = γei − possible envy rent− possible info rent.
The timing of the game is as follows. In Stage 0, each employee is informed about his own
type; in Stage 1, the employer offers a menu of contracts consisting of levels of effort and wages;
in Stage 2, employees independently decide whether or not to accept a contract. Once a contract
is accepted and the worker is hired, the type of each employee and the accepted contract become
common knowledge;12 in Stage 3, the effort is exerted, production is undertaken, wages are paid,
and profits are realized.
We are going to show that three types of solution emerge. We call ‘envy at the top’ the
solution where high-ability employees receive the lower net compensation, i.e. NL > NH ; ‘envy
at the bottom’ is the solution in which low-ability employees receive the lower net compensation,
i.e. NL < NH ; finally, the ‘envy free’ solution occurs when NL = NH and the two types of
workers receive the same net compensation. In each solution, envious employees are rewarded
with an ‘envy rent’.
(possibly) offered by the employer.
12This assumption allows the employees to compare their rents. In contrast, we do not assume that
the employer and her employees are able to renegotiate the contract.
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4 Mission and fairness concerns under full information
If workers’ ability is observable, the employer maximizes equation (1) subject to the employees’
participation constraint:
Ni + γei − β (max {N−i −Ni, 0}) ≥ 0 (2)
The firm optimally sets the workers’ participation constraints to zero and must reward
those employees who receive the lower net compensation. This limits the firm’s ability to take
advantage of labor donations from high-ability workers.13
We find that two mutually exclusive solutions are possible under full information: one
entailing ‘envy at the top’ (NL > NH) and the other being ‘envy free’ (NL = NH). Condition
1 below assures that NL > NH and holds if and only if eH > eL. If Condition 1 does not hold,
then NL = NH and eH = eL, so that the solution is envy-free.
Condition 1: ∆θ >
βγ
(1− λ)(1 + β + γ) .
According to Condition 1, different net compensations and effort levels are profitable only if
employees’ heterogeneity, ∆θ, is high enough. Intuitively, compensating high-ability employees
for being envious is profitable only when their labor donation is sufficiently larger than the
one from low-ability employees, or when heterogeneity is high. Conversely, when employees’
heterogeneity is low, so that Condition 1 is not met, then the firm optimally sets employees’
net compensations (and, thus, their labor donations) equal so as to save high-ability employees’
envy rent.
Interestingly, the right-hand side of Condition 1 increases in γ and in β, meaning that
Condition 1 becomes more and more difficult to satisfy as the cost of envy and/or the degree of
the employer’s mission (and thus labor donations from her employees) increase. In Figure 1 we
represent the regions of parameters where the solutions NL > NH and NL = NH take place in
the plane (γ, θ). Notice that an increase in β reduces the area in which the solution NL > NH
is possible (second graph in Figure 1). Intuitively, as workers’ concern about pay inequality
increases, the employer has to provide a higher ‘envy rent’ to compensate high-ability workers
receiving the lower net compensation. This reduces the employer’s incentives to extract higher
13In Appendix A.1 and A.2 we show the solution of the extreme cases in which the organization has
no mission (γ = 0), and in which the workers are not envious (β = 0).
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labor donations from high-ability workers. It is worth noticing that if the mission was not
relevant at all, i.e. if γ = 0, envy would not play any role under full information (see Appendix
A.2).
NL > NH
NL = NH
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Γ1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
Θ
NL > NH
NL = NH
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Γ1.0
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1.8
2.0
Θ
Figure 1: Condition 1 with λ = 0.5 and β = 0.3 or β = 0.7.
To derive workers’ (net) labor donations let us consider the expressions for wages as a
function of effort levels when Condition 1 holds:
ωL =
1
2θe
2
L − γeL,
ωH =
1
2e
2
H − γeH + β(NL −NH) = 12e2H − γ
(
1
1 + β
eH +
β
1 + β
eL
)
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
envy rent as a decrease in labor donation
(3)
Recalling Definition 1, net compensation of low-ability workers is ωL− 12θe2L = NL = −γeL which
is negative. Low-ability workers are here offering to the firm all their premium for contributing to
its output. In other words, their labor donation corresponds to γeL. Net compensation of high-
ability workers is instead NH = −γ( 11+β eH + β1+β eL) and their labor donation is consequently
equal to γ( 11+β eH +
β
1+β eL). This is a general feature of our model: net labor donation always
corresponds to the negative of workers’ net compensation Ni.
It is worth noticing that optimal contracts are such that the high-ability employees’ labor
donation is γ( 11+β eH +
β
1+β eL) < γeH . The intuition is the following. As mentioned in point
(ii) of the model set-up, by offering contracts contingent on the employees’ ability, the employer
takes advantage of the larger labor donation from high-ability employees. However, given that
under full information eH > eL goes hand by hand with NL > NH , the higher labor donation
from high-ability employees is partially offset by the envy rent they receive. Hence, the employer
faces a trade-off between separating efforts’ levels from employees of different types and paying
the envy rent to high-ability ones.
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Optimal efforts write:
eFTL =
1
θ +
γ
θ
(
1 + λ1−λ
β
1+β
)
, eFTH = 1 +
γ
1+β , (4)
where superscript FT stands for the solution of full-information with ‘envy at the top’. One can
easily check that β has a negative impact on eFTH , while it impacts positively on e
FT
L . Hence,
the higher the utility loss from envy experienced by high-ability employees, the lower the effort
required from them and the higher the effort required from low-ability colleagues. Indeed, by
reducing the effort of high-ability employees and by increasing the one of low-ability employees,
the employer reduces the gap between net compensations and, thus, the disutility from envy.
As a consequence, she can pay a lower envy rent to high-ability employees, but she also extracts
lower labor donations from high-types.
When extracting larger labor donations from high-ability types becomes too costly, the
employer optimally switches to the ‘envy free’ solution with effort levels eFFH = e
FF
L =
1+γ
λ+(1−λ)θ ,
where FF stands for the solution of full-information free of envy. As we expected, here the
effort does not depend on β.
Proposition 1 summarizes the solution under full information.
Proposition 1. Envy under full information. When the firm observes the employees’ ability, two
solutions exist. (i) If workers heterogeneity is sufficiently high, optimal contracts entail ‘envy
at the top’ (0 > NL > NH) , efforts are described in (4) above and are such that e
FT
H > e
FT
L .
Despite the ‘envy rent’ that high-ability workers receive, their (net) labor donation is higher
than the one from low-ability workers. (ii) If workers heterogeneity is low, then contracts are
envy free (0 > NL = NH) with e
FF
H = e
FF
L . Here both workers’ types provide the same labor
donation.
5 Mission, fairness concerns, and screening
When the employees’ ability is their private information, labor donations are reduced not only
because of workers’ concerns for fairness, but also because of information rents to be paid
for screening. Recall that our objective is to derive net labor donations corresponding to the
negative of workers’ net compensations (−Ni) .
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The organization maximizes
pi = λ (eH − ωH) + (1− λ) (eL − ωL)
subject to the employees’ participation and incentive constraints:
NH + γeH − βmax{(NL −NH , 0)} ≥ 0 (PCH)
NL + γeL − βmax{(NH −NL, 0)} ≥ 0 (PCL)
NH + γeH − βmax{(NL −NH , 0)} ≥ NˆL + γeL − βmax{(NH − NˆL, 0)} (ICH)
NL + γeL − βmax{(NH −NL, 0)} ≥ NˆH + γeH − βmax{(NL − NˆH , 0)} (ICL)
where NˆL = ωL − 12e2L and NˆH = ωH − θ2e2H .
In the right-hand side of the incentive constraints, the worker’s disutility from envy is com-
puted by considering the difference between net compensation obtained by truthfully reporting
his type and net compensation obtained as a mimicker. Specifically, NˆL is the net compensation
that high-ability employees with θH = 1 attain when they pretend to be low-ability, while NˆH
is the net compensation that low-ability employees with θL = θ > 1 attain when they pretend
to be high-ability workers.14
In the next subsections, we describe the four feasible solutions under asymmetric information
on the employees’ ability. In Subsection 5.1, we characterize the ‘envy at the top’ solution where
NL > NH . In Subsection 5.2, we describe the ‘envy free’ solution whereNL = NH . In Subsection
5.3, we study the ‘envy at the bottom’ solution where NL < NH . Interestingly, this solution
was not possible in the case of full information. In Subsection 5.3.1, we characterize the pooling
solution where both types of employees receive the same contract. Finally, in Subsection 5.4,
we derive the optimal solution, i.e. the one assuring the highest payoff to the organization. The
latter depends on the values of the parameters ∆θ, β and γ.
14Rearranging the expressions for NˆH and NˆL we observe that:
NH = NˆH +
1
2
∆θe2H ⇒ NH > NˆH
NL = NˆL − 1
2
∆θe2L ⇒ NL < NˆL
Constraints from (PCH) to (ICL) are ultimately defined by the ordering of truthfully reporters’ and
mimickers’ net compensations. In Appendix A.4 we describe the possible orderings of Ni and Nˆi, and
we explain which, among them, give rise to feasible solutions.
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5.1 Screening with ‘envy at the top’
When the employer designs contracts in which high-ability workers receive the lower net com-
pensation (NL > NH), the unique possible solution is the one in which (ICH) and (PCL) are
both binding. In particular, wages can be written as:
ωTL =
1
2
θe2L − γeL, (5)
ωTH =
1
2
e2H − γ
(
1
1 + β
eH +
β
1 + β
eL
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
envy rent as a decrease in labor donation
+
1
2
∆θ
1 + β
e2L︸ ︷︷ ︸
info rent
, (6)
where the superscript T stands for ‘envy at the top’.
Low-ability employees receive neither an information nor an envy rent. In contrast, high-
ability employees must here be rewarded both for receiving the lower net compensation and
for truthfully revealing their private information. As under full information, the ‘envy rent’
translates in a reduction of labor donation. As for the information rent paid to the high-ability
employees, it is increasing in the workers’ heterogeneity, as it is standard in the classic adverse
selection model. However, the information rent is now decreasing in the envy parameter β. This
implies a ‘negative spillover’ of the envy rent on the information rent: as β increases, the ‘envy
rent’ increases as well (because labor donation becomes lower and lower), while the information
rent decreases.
From (6) and (5), net compensations are:
NTL = −γeL, NTH = −γ
(
1
1+β eH +
β
1+β eL
)
+ 12
∆θ
1+β e
2
L. (7)
Recall that, at the ‘envy at the top’ solution, it must be NL > NH . Given that N
T
L is negative,
0 > NTL > N
T
H holds, implying that both (net) labor donations are positive. In particular,
high-ability types’ labor donation is only partially offset by their information rent and is still
higher than the one of low-ability workers:
γ
(
1
1 + β
eH +
β
1 + β
eL
)
+
1
2
∆θ
1 + β
e2L > γeL > 0.
Rearranging the previous inequality, we observe that at the ‘envy at the top’ solution effort
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levels must satisfy the following inequality:
γ
1 + β
(eH − eL) > 1
2
∆θ
1 + β
e2L. (8)
Condition (8) shows that monotonicity (eH > eL) must be satisfied.
15 Its interpretation is
straightforward: Condition (8) states that the information rent paid to high-ability employees
must be low enough to maintain NL > NH and to let the firm take advantage of heterogeneous
labor donations from the two types. In turn, the benefit from extracting a higher labor donation
from high-ability employees is increasing in the relevance of the firm’s mission.
Substituting wage levels (6) and (5) into the employer’s program and computing the FOCs
with respect to effort levels, one obtains:
eTL =
λβγ+(1−λ)(1+γ)(1+β)
∆θλ+(1−λ)(1+β)θ ; e
T
H = 1 +
γ
1+β . (9)
High-ability workers exert the same effort as under full information. Not surprisingly, the
effort level of low-ability workers is downward distorted. The higher workers’ heterogeneity
∆θ, the higher the distortion in the effort exerted by low-ability employees. The degree of
the employer’s mission γ has a positive impact on effort, irrespective of the agents’ type. In
contrast, the envy parameter β has a negative impact on eH , but its impact on eL is positive.
From the effort levels in (9) we observe that the monotonicity condition eTH > e
T
L always
holds. In addition, comparing labor donations at this solution with those obtained at the cor-
responding solution under full information, and recalling that eTH = e
FT
H while e
T
L < e
FT
L , we
observe that net labor donations from both types of workers are lower under adverse selection.
Not surprisingly, the information rent paid to high-ability employees reduces their labor dona-
tions. Moreover, in order to pay a lower information rent, the employer distorts the effort of
low-ability workers downward.
Substituting the effort levels in (9) into Condition (8) we obtain the region of the parameters
for which this solution is feasible. Interestingly, we find that the ‘envy at the top’ solution is
only feasible when both motivation from the employer’s mission and workers’ heterogeneity are
high enough.
The following lemma characterizes the ‘envy at the top’ solution:
15In Appendix A.5 we also derive the implementability condition for this program which is weaker
than eH > eL and thus turns out to be irrelevant (see Condition 22).
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Lemma 1. Screening with ‘envy at the top’. The solution in which 0 > NL > NH is feasible
when the organization’s mission is relevant and heterogeneity in workers’ ability is high. Efforts
are described in (9) above and are such that the effort exerted by high-ability workers is equal
to the corresponding effort of full information
(
eTH = e
FT
H
)
, whereas the effort exerted by low-
ability workers is downward distorted
(
eTL < e
FT
L
)
. Net labor donation from high-ability workers
is higher than the one from low-ability workers. Net labor donations from both high- and low-
ability workers are lower than under full information.
5.2 Screening with ‘envy-free’ contracts
The unique possible solution such that net compensations are equal requires the incentive com-
patibility constraint of high-ability workers to be binding (while no participation constraint is
binding at this solution). By imposing NL = NH and by setting the incentive constraint of
high-ability types binding, the solution entails:
γ(eH − eL) = 1
2
∆θe2L. (10)
The previous condition specifies the difference between effort levels assuring both that the
solution is envy-free and that high ability workers are not willing to mimic low-ability types.
Also notice that Condition (10) is fully consistent with (8).
The optimal envy-free contracts are such that:
eFL =
2γ
1+
√
θ
eFH =
2γ
√
θ
1+
√
θ
(11)
ωFL = ω
F
H = ω
F = 2θγ
2
(1+
√
θ)
2
where the superscript F stays for envy-free. One can easily check that the effort levels in
(11) satisfy condition (10) and implies that net compensations are zero (NL = NH = 0). As
a consequence, irrespective of the model’s parameters, the screening solution with envy-free
contracts is always feasible.
The lemma below characterizes the envy-free solution:
Lemma 2. Screening with ‘envy-free’ contracts. The envy-free solution is always feasible. Ef-
forts and wages are described in (11) above and are such that eFH > e
F
L and ω
F
H = ω
F
L = ω
F .
Net labor donations of both types are zero (NL = NH = 0).
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Given that labor donations are zero and the utilities of both types of employees are strictly
positive (UH > UL > 0) , this solution is costly for the employer. Hence, envy-free contracts will
be implemented only when other more profitable solutions are not feasible (see Subsection 5.4).
5.3 Screening with ‘envy at the bottom’
While under full information optimal contracts are such that the net compensation of low-
ability employees is always weakly higher than the one of high-ability workers (NH ≤ NL),
under asymmetric information a new solution is possible, entailing a higher net compensation
for high-ability workers (NH > NL). Intuitively, this solution becomes relevant when the infor-
mation rent to be paid to high-ability types is high enough to revert the ordering between net
compensations.
As at the ‘envy at the top’ solution, we find that constraints ICH and PCL must be binding.
From the latter constraints, wages can be written as:
ωBL =
1
2
θe2L − γ
(
1
1 + β
eL +
β
1 + β
eH
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
increased labor donation
+
1
2
β∆θe2L,︸ ︷︷ ︸
envy rent
(12)
ωBH =
1
2
e2H − γeH +
1
2
∆θe2L︸ ︷︷ ︸
info rent
+
1
2
β∆θe2L,︸ ︷︷ ︸
cumulated envy rent
(13)
where the superscript B stands for solution with ‘envy at the bottom’.
Low-ability employees are the ones receiving the lower net compensation and are thus re-
warded an envy-rent, i.e. 12β∆θe
2
L. As β increases so does the envy rent paid to low-ability
employees. However, such envy-rent is partially offset by an increase of labor donation captured
by the term γ
(
1
1+β eL +
β
1+β eH
)
> γeL. High-ability employees cumulate the same envy-rent
and, on top of that, they also receive their standard information rent. The two rents sum up
to the term 12(1 + β)∆θe
2
L which may partially or totally offset their labor donation γeH .
Net compensations write:
NBL = −γ
(
1
1+β eL +
β
1+β eH
)
+ 12β∆θe
2
L, N
B
H = −γeH + 12(1 + β)∆θe2L, (14)
where it must be NH > NL. Substituting expressions (14) in the previous inequality we obtain
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that, at the ‘envy at the bottom’ solution, effort levels must satisfy the following condition:
γ(eH − eL) < 1
2
(1 + β) ∆θe2L. (15)
Condition (15) states that the total rent paid to high-ability types (which contains the informa-
tion rent and the ‘cumulated envy rent’) must be higher than the difference in labor donations
provided by the two types of workers. With respect to the envy at the top solution, here
the firm’s mission is relatively unimportant, labor donations are relatively low and thus the
information rent paid to high-ability workers reverses the ordering of net compensations.
Summing up the incentive constraints we derive the implementability condition for this
program which implies ‘strong’ monotonicity:
eBH ≥ eBL
√
1 + β. (16)
By substituting wages (12) and (13) into the firm’s program and deriving FOCs with respect
to the effort levels, we obtain:
eBL =
(1−λ)(1+β+γ)
(1+β)[λ∆θ(1+β)+(1−λ)(θ+β∆θ)] ; e
B
H = 1 + γ + γ
1−λ
λ
β
1+β . (17)
While the effort level of low-ability workers is downward distorted, high-ability employees exert
a higher level of effort than under full information.
Substituting effort levels (17) into (14), we find that net labor donations are lower than
under full information because of the ‘envy rent’ paid to low-ability types, and also rewarded
to high-ability types, and because of the information rent paid to high-ability types. Finally,
while net labor donation from low-ability types is always positive, it is possible that the term
1
2(1+β)∆θe
2
L in (13) is so high that net labor donation from high-ability types becomes negative.
The ‘envy at the bottom’ solution is feasible when Conditions (15) and (16) are both satisfied.
Substituting the expressions for the effort levels in (17) into conditions (15) and (16) we obtain
the region of the parameters such that this solution is feasible. As expected, the ‘envy at the
bottom’ solution is feasible when the employer’s mission is not very relevant.
The following lemma characterizes the ‘envy at the bottom’ solution:
Lemma 3. Screening with ‘envy at the bottom’. The ‘envy at the bottom’ solution (NH > NL) is
feasible when the employer’s mission is not relevant. Efforts are described in (17) above and are
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such that the effort of high-ability workers is upward distorted
(
eTH > e
FT
H
)
, whereas the effort
of low-ability workers is downward distorted
(
eTL < e
FT
L
)
with respect to full information. Net
labor donation from low-ability workers is always positive (NL < 0), whereas the one from high-
ability workers can be negative (NH ≶ 0). Net labor donations from both high- and low-ability
employees are lower than under full information.
5.3.1 Pooling contracts
When the employer offers pooling contracts with eH = eL = e
P and ωH = ωL = ω
P , we
necessarily are in a case of ‘envy at the bottom’ because low-ability types provide effort at
a higher cost and thus receive a lower net compensation. Hence, low-ability workers accept
the contract only if they are compensated with an ‘envy rent’. The latter is set such that the
participation constraint of low-ability types is binding, while the one of high-ability workers is
a fortiori satisfied. From (PCL), the pooling wage writes:
ωP =
1
2
θ
(
eP
)2 − γeP + 1
2
β∆θ
(
eP
)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
envy rent
where the last term corresponds to the envy rent paid to low-ability workers which is also
rewarded to their high-ability colleagues.
Substituting wage ωP into the profit function and computing the first-order condition with
respect to eP , we obtain:
eP = 1+γβ∆θ+θ ; ω
P = 12
(1+γ)(1−γ)
β∆θ+θ
(18)
The lemma below characterizes the pooling contract (eP , ωP ):
Lemma 4. Pooling. The pooling contract is always feasible and it entails ‘envy at the bottom’
(NH > NL). The effort and the wage are described in (18) above. Labor donation from low-
ability workers is perfectly offset by the envy rent (NL = 0), while net labor donation from
high-ability workers is negative (NH > 0).
This solution is always feasible, but it is costly for the employer. This is because net labor
donation from low-ability workers is zero, whereas the one from high-types is negative. Workers’
utilities are such that UH > UL = 0.
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5.4 The prevailing solution
In parameters’ regions where more than one solutions is feasible, the employer will pick the
one which assures the highest payoff. In this section, we compare the firm’s payoff under the
different feasible solutions and we derive the optimal one.
As we have shown in the previous subsections, both screening with ‘envy free’ contracts and
pooling contracts are always feasible. The solution with ‘envy at the top’ and the one with
‘envy at the bottom’ are instead only feasible under some conditions. The former is feasible
when both motivation from the employer’s mission, γ, and workers’ heterogeneity, ∆θ, are high
enough; the latter when motivation is low. Using standard mathematical programming, one can
show that the parameters’ regions in which the ‘envy at the top’ and the ‘envy at the bottom’
solutions are feasible do not overlap.16 In addition, in the region of the parameters where the
solution with ‘envy at the top’ is feasible, it assures the largest payoff to the firm. Similarly,
when the solution with ‘envy at the bottom’ is feasible, the latter leads to the largest payoff.
Finally, when neither of the two previous solutions is feasible, the employer will implement the
solution with pooling contracts because it assures a payoff to the organization which is larger
than the one obtained with ‘envy free’ contracts.
As an intuition, the pooling solution turns out to dominate the ‘envy free’ solution because
under pooling the employer is able to set the utility of low-ability workers to zero (UH > UL = 0),
whereas she must leave positive utilities to both types (UH > UL > 0) if ‘envy free’ contracts are
implemented. In other words, the employer is almost always constrained to leave larger rents
to her employees when she offers the same net compensations to workers of different types.
Moreover, discarding the pooling solution when the screening one is possible is not surprisingly
because a pooling contract is always dominated by two screening contracts.
The prevailing solutions are illustrated in the figure below, while the following proposition
summarizes the previous discussion.
Proposition 2. The prevailing solutions. Three optimal solutions exist: (i) when the employer’s
mission, γ, is relevant and workers’ heterogeneity, ∆θ, is high, then the optimal solution entails
screening with ‘envy at the top’. (ii) When the employer’s mission is not relevant, then the
optimal solution entails screening with ‘envy at the bottom’. (iii) When neither of the two
previous screening solutions is feasible, the optimal solution entails pooling with ‘envy at the
bottom’.
16Mathematica files are available upon request to the authors.
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Figure 2: Prevailing solution with λ = 0.5 and β = 0.3 or β = 0.7.
Interestingly, an increase in β reduces the area in which the employer implements the two
screening solutions (second graph in Figure 2). The intuition is similar to the one provided
under full information: as the utility loss from envy increases, the employer has to compensate
lower net-earners more. And as the ‘envy rent’ rent increases, offering separating contracts
becomes less convenient for the organization.
Discussion of our theoretical results. We conclude this section by comparing our results with
those obtained by previous theoretical studies on fairness concerns. In such studies workers do
not share the mission of the organization and, as a consequence, they do not offer any labor
donation to their employer.
Similarly to Desiraju and Sappington (2007), we find that both high-ability and low-ability
employees can experience pay inequalities at the optimal screening contracts. However, while in
Desiraju and Sappington (2007) the output of the high-ability employees is downward distorted,
we find that it is upward distorted when the employer’s mission is not particularly relevant,
namely at the solution with ‘envy at the bottom’. In our model, by distorting the effort of high-
ability workers upward, the employer is able to increase net labor donation from high-ability
employees without affecting the information and envy rents (which only depend on the effort of
their low-ability colleagues, see expression 13). In addition, while offering ‘envy free’ contracts
is never optimal in our model, eliminating all ex-post inequity can be optimal in Desiraju and
Sappington (2007). This difference is driven both by the existence of labor donations in our
model and by the fact that employees suffer from inequity aversion in Desiraju and Sappington
(2007), implying that all workers must be compensated with a rent when some inequity exists.
In von Siemens (2011, 2012), and Manna (2016), optimal contracts are such that high-ability
employees never suffer from envy and exert the efficient level of effort. Low-ability workers,
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instead, are envious of their high-ability colleagues who receive the information rent and must
be compensated with an envy rent. In addition, their effort is optimally distorted downward.
This downward distortion of the effort exerted by low-ability workers also emerges in our model
both at the ‘envy at the top’ and at the ‘envy at the bottom’ solution. To understand why,
take for example the ‘envy at the bottom’ solution and consider that the envy rent paid to low-
ability workers must also be paid to high-ability workers in order to prevent mimicking. Since
the information rent and the two envy rents are costly for the firm and they depend on the
effort exerted by low-ability employees, the firm finds it profitable to further distort away from
efficiency the effort of the low-ability employees with respect to the standard adverse-selection
problem without envy. As a result, we can conclude that envy magnifies the distortion in the
effort exerted by the low-ability employees.
6 Empirical Analysis
To test the main theoretical predictions of our model we make use of the German Socio-Economic
Panel data (GSOEP), a representative panel study of the resident population in Germany. The
data include a wide range of information on individual and household characteristics, like em-
ployment, education, earnings, and personal attitudes.17 Our key variables are fairness concerns,
employees’ ability, and the sector of employment which captures the relevance of the employer’s
mission. Specifically, we are going to check predictions (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2.
Data on Perceived Income Fairness. In the 2005 wave of the survey we find the following
question: Is the income that you earn at your current job fair, from your point of view? 18 Table
2 shows the distribution of answers.
Income Fair Frequency Percentage Cumulative
Yes 6,232 67.54 67.54
No 2,995 32.46 100
Total 9,227 100
Table 2: Fairness Concerns in the dataset (2005 wave). Distribution of Answers
We create a dummy variable called Fairness that takes value 1 if employees answer yes to
17Detailed information about the SOEP can be found at http://www.diw.de/en/soep.
18Notice that the same question is also asked in the 2009 wave. In the appendix, as a robustness
check, we replicate our analysis precisely using the 2009 wave.
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the previous question, and 0 otherwise. This will be our dependent variable.
Data on Perceived Employees’ Ability. The same wave also includes the following state-
ments:
 I see myself as someone who does things effectively and efficiently.
 I see myself as someone who does a thorough job.
 I see myself as someone who is original, comes up with new ideas.
Respondents were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale how well this statement applies to
them. An answer of 1 means “does not apply at all”, while an answer of 7 means “applies to
me perfectly”.19 The responses to these three statements are strongly correlated. Therefore,
we construct a measure of ability by taking the average responses over the three statements.20
As a robustness check, we also consider these statements individually as different measures of
the employees’ perceived ability. The results of our analysis continue to hold.
Figure 3 shows the distributions of responses to each of the three statements. The first graph
in Figure 4 shows the average responses over the three statements for the entire population,
while the second graph shows the average responses in the Public services sector. We are going
to explain why we make this distinction later on. For the moment just notice that the average
distributions of responses are very similar.
Control variables. In the regressions presented below, we control for sectors, occupations,
gender, age, education, and whether employees are white or blue collar.21 See Table 3 for more
details on the independent variables of our analysis.
19Since these data are self-reported, a possible objection is that people are too self-confident in deter-
mining their ability in the workplace. However, using a representative sample of the German population,
Abeler et al. (2014) find that participants forego considerable amounts of money to avoid lying. Even if,
in their setup, participants have a clear monetary incentive to misreport, the authors find that aggregate
reporting behavior is close to the expected truthful distribution. This result suggests that participants
have a large cost of lying.
20In the 2009 wave of the survey there is an additional statement that is strictly correlated to the
previous ones: I see myself as someone who is eager for knowledge. When using the 2009 wave, we
construct our measure of ability by taking the average response over the four statements.
21In the 2009 wave we can also use the organization’s size as a control.
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Figure 3: The histograms show the average responses to each of the three statements in 2005.
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Figure 4: The histograms show the average responses over the three statements in 2005 for the
entire population (on the left) and only for the public services sector (on the right).
Ability Average responses over the three statements.
Male Dummy variable: 1=male.
Age
Education Dummy variable: 1= degree.
White-collar Dummy variable: 1=white-collar, 0=blue-collar.
Sector Sectors correspond to the classification of economic activities of the
European Community (NACE code). It is controlled by 12 dummies.
Agriculture, forest and mining sectors serve as a baseline.
Occupation Occupations correspond to the ISCO code.
It is controlled by 9 dummies.
Table 3: Description of independent variables (2005 wave)
Predictions. We test the following predictions of our theoretical model:
1. High-ability employees receive a higher wage and work for a larger amount of hours than
their low-ability colleagues.
2. High-ability employees perceive their wage as less fair than low-ability employees in sectors
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where labor donation is important (or where the employer’s mission is relevant).
3. High-ability employees perceive their wage as more fair than low-ability employees in
sectors where labor donation is not important (or where the employer’s mission is not
relevant).
While the first prediction is always valid irrespective of the sectors where the firm operates,
Predictions 2 and 3 depend on the relevance of the firm’s mission which in turn is related to the
sector of activity. In Table 4 we show the sector classification and the distribution of employees
working in each sector in 2005.
Frequency Percentage Cumulative
0. Agriculture, forest and mining 130 1.41 1.41
1. Manufacturing 2,246 24.34 25.75
2. Electricity, gas 102 1.11 26.86
3. Construction 443 4.80 31.66
4. Trade 1,154 12.51 44.16
5. Transport 489 5.30 49.46
6. Restaurants and hotels 218 2.36 51.83
7. Insurance and Real Estate 490 5.31 57.14
8. Other business activities 661 7.16 64.30
9. Public Services 2,808 30.43 94.73
10. Arts, entertainment and recreation 304 3.29 98.03
11. National executive committee 39 0.42 98.45
12. Others 143 1.55 100
Total 9,227 100
Table 4: Sector Classification
To test Predictions 2 and 3, we have to identify those sectors in which the organization’s
mission plays a relevant role and employees enjoy some non-monetary benefits from their job. To
achieve this aim, we use two alternative methods. First, we consider “Sectors with High Labor
Donation” the ones where a high percentage of employees works overtime and does not receive
any compensation for that. In particular, in the survey we find the following two questions:
Do you work overtime? If you do work overtime, is the work paid, compensated with time-off,
or not compensated at all? We argue that employees who are interested in the organization’s
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mission are more likely to do unpaid overtime. Similarly to our analysis, Gregg et al. (2011) use
unpaid overtime as their measure of donated labor. The authors argue that unpaid overtime is
a good proxy as it captures the hours worked above the contractual requirement for which the
individual does not receive any direct compensation. Using the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS), Gregg et al. (2011) show that workers in the non-profit sector are more likely to do
unpaid overtime than those in the for-profit sector.22
Second, as a robustness check, we consider “Sectors with High Labor Donation” the ones
where there is a high percentage of employees who are not happy about their monetary com-
pensation, but their satisfaction in the workplace is high.23 The idea here is that people who
adhere to the mission of their employer like their job and remain in the organization even if
they perceive their compensation as too low.
Using these alternative methods, we find that the sector where labor donation is particularly
important is the one that provides Public Services: Sector 9 in Table 4. Figure 5 shows the
distribution of answers for unpaid overtime in each sector. It is possible to notice that almost
the 30% of employees in the Public Services Sector work overtime and they do not receive
any monetary compensation for that. This sector includes Public Administration and Defense,
Education, and Health Care. In this sector, there is a total of 2,808 individuals who responded
the questions (more than 30% of the entire sample). Most part of employees are women (64.60%
against the 35.40% of men). While the 46% of men holds a university degree, only the 36% of
the women does. The average age is 43 years.
As a robustness check, in the appendix, we exclude civil servants from employees belong-
ing to the Public Services Sector. When we restrict our analysis to private firms’ employees,
a total of 2,050 individuals filled the survey. Most part are women (73% against the 27% of
men). While the 38% of men holds a university degree, only the 27% of the women does. The
average age is 42 years. Importantly, our results continue to hold when we restrict the analysis
to private firms’ employees (see Table 9 in Appendix B), showing that results are not driven by
22Salamon et al. (2012) also show that volunteer time accounts for about a quarter of not-for-profit
contribution to GDP on average in the seven countries studied. Non-profit firms can be seen as a
particular subset of mission-oriented firms.
23In this case, we combine the following question: How satisfied are you with your job? with the one
regarding the perceived income fairness. More specifically, we consider individuals who do not perceive
their income as fair, but their satisfaction in the job is above average.
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Figure 5: Distribution of answers for unpaid overtime in each sector. Unpaid overtime is used
as a proxy for labor donation.
the peculiarity of public firms present in the Public Services Sector.
Empirical Analysis. In total 9,227 individuals responded to the questions on fairness, ability,
and those regarding the controls. We consider all individuals working full time and part time,
but we exclude apprentices and those who did not provide an answer. In all regressions, we
cluster standard errors at NACE 2-digit level but the results are robust if we cluster them at
the occupation level.
Results. Let us start considering Prediction 1. Irrespective of the sectors that we con-
sider, self-assessed high-ability employees receive a higher wage and work more hours than
self-assessed low-ability employees. These results are provided in Table 5. Also notice that
all the independent variables have a positive and highly significant impact on income. Similar
results are achieved when we measure the impact of the different variables on the contracted
working hours (Column 2), with the exception of white collar whose effect is not significant.
Furthermore, high-ability employees are more satisfied in their job and in life overall than low-
ability employees, while age has a negative and significant impact on satisfaction. Finally, a
higher level of education has a positive and significant impact on overall life satisfaction.
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Income Working Hours Job Satisfaction Overall Life Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS coeff. OLS coeff. OLS coeff. OLS coeff.
Ability 98.24*** 5.21*** 0.46*** 0.31***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 1161.84*** 67.58*** 0.05 0.06
(0.000) (0.000) (0.344) (0.102)
Age 26.36*** - 0.81*** -0.012*** -0.009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 720.22*** 12.7*** -0.095 0.109**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.183) (0.036)
White Collar 435.27*** -2.83 -0.095 0.019
(0.000) (0.230) (0.112) (0.658)
Observations 9,227 9,227 9,227 9,227
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 5: Prediction 1. The dependent variables are Income, Working Hours, Job Satisfaction,
and Overall Life Satisfaction. The table reports the OLS coefficients. P-values are reported in
parentheses. *** Denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at
the 10 percent level.
We now consider Prediction 2. To test this prediction, we focus our analysis on the Public
Services Sector, where a large fraction of employees work overtime even if they do not receive
any compensation for that. We study the relationship between the employees’ perceived ability
and their perceived fairness concerns in this sector. Our theoretical model predicts that, in this
sector in which labor donations are important, high-ability employees are the ones who suffer
because of envy. Since our dependent variable is a dummy, we use the Logit model.24 In Table
6 we report the coefficients and odds ratio of the Logit model for the Public Services Sector.
While Columns 1 and 2 only consider ability and only control for the employees’ occupation,
Columns 3 and 4 consider all the independent variables. P-values are reported in parentheses.
Results are in line with our theoretical predictions. More specifically, in the Public Services
Sector the coefficients of ability have the negative sign and are statistically significant. To
provide an interpretation of the magnitude of the effects, we report the odds ratio of the Logit
24Similar results are obtained with a Probit model and are available upon request.
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model (Columns 2 and 4). We find that for a one unit increase in the scale of ability the odds
of fair income versus no fair income are 0.82 (0.83) times lower, given all the other variables
constant. Table 6 also shows that the other independent variables have a statistically significant
impact on the employees’ fairness perception of income, with the exception of gender. A white-
collar worker is more likely to perceive his wage as unfair than a blue-collar worker. This result
goes in the same direction of the impact of the perceived employees’ ability on fairness. A
possible explanation is the following. Blue-collar workers are less interested in the organization’s
mission because they typically carry out more routine jobs and have less responsibilities. Finally,
a higher level of education has a negative impact on the perceived fairness, while the age impacts
positively on it, but its size is very low.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fairness Logit Odds Ratio Logit Odds Ratio
Ability -0.20*** 0.82*** -0.18*** 0.83***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Male -0.077 0.93
(0.413) (0.413)
Age 0.008** 1.00**
(0.040) (0.040)
Higher -0.46*** 0.63***
(0.000) (0.000)
White-collar -0.40*** 0.67***
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2,808 2,808 2,808 2,808
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 6: Prediction 2. We consider the Public Services sector. The table reports the coefficients
and odds ratio of the Logit model. While Columns 1 and 2 only consider our measure of
ability and control for the employees’ occupation, Columns 3 and 4 consider all the independent
variables. P-values are reported in parentheses. In all regressions, standard errors are clustered
at NACE 2-digit level. *** Denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level,
and * at the 10 percent level.
As predicted by our theoretical model, high-ability employees perceive their wage as unfair
relatively more than low-ability employees in the public services sector where labor donation is
important. Therefore, Prediction 2 is confirmed.
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Finally, we test Prediction 3. Since labor donation is not particularly high in the other
sectors, we first test this prediction by using all the dataset with the exception of the Public
Services sector and we find that the impact of the employees’ perceived ability on fairness is
not statically significant. Then, we analyze its impact in each sector in isolation and we find
that the employees’ perceived ability has a positive and statically significant impact on fairness
in the Trade Sector (sector G in the Nace classification). This sector includes: Trade, Repair
of Cars; Trade, brokerage and wholesale trade; Retail trade; Guest industry. In total 1,154
individuals work in this sector (the 12.5% of the entire sample), the most part of employees are
women (63% against the 37% of men). Only the 10% of the men (6% of the women) holds a
university degree. The average age is 40 years.
In Table 7 we report the coefficients and odds ratio of the Logit model for this sector. While
Columns 1 and 2 only consider ability and control for the employees’ occupation, Columns 3
and 4 consider all the independent variables. P-values are reported in parentheses. To provide
an interpretation of the magnitude of the effects, we report the odds ratio of the Logit model
(Columns 2 and 4). We find that for a one unit increase in the scale of ability the odds of fair
income versus no fair income are 1.18 times higher, keeping constant all the other variables.
Therefore, we can conclude that Prediction 3 is confirmed when we consider the Trade Sector.
Table 7 also shows that the other independent variables do not have a statistically significant
impact on the employees’ fairness perception of their income.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fairness Logit Odds Ratio Logit Odds Ratio
Ability 0.16** 1.18** 0.16** 1.18**
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Male 0.07 1.07
(0.663) (0.663)
Age 0.003 1.003
(0.557) (0.557)
Education -0.41 0.66
(0.104) (0.104)
White-collar -0.009 0.99
(0.955) (0.955)
Observations 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 7: Prediction 3. We consider the Trade sector. The table reports the coefficients and
odds ratio of the Logit model. While Columns 1 and 2 only consider our measure of ability and
control for the employees’ occupation, Columns 3 and 4 consider all the independent variables.
P-values are reported in parentheses. In all regressions, standard errors are clustered at NACE
2-digit level. ***Denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at
the 10 percent level.
7 Conclusion
Despite receiving monetary compensations that are higher than the ones received by their
less talented colleagues, productive workers may well perceive their situation as unfair when
comparing the more demanding tasks and difficult duties they are required to perform with
the ones of their less talented colleagues. Our empirical evidence documents that this occurs
in those firms whose mission is important: in Public Administration, Defense, Education, and
Health Care, the workers who consider their compensation as unfair are mainly the ones who
earn more, are required to work a larger number of hours, and who see themselves as highly
productive, i.e. the most talented employees. Conversely, in the Trade sector where the firms’
mission is not particularly relevant and unpaid overtime is quite rare (and thus labor donation
is low or inexistent), the workers who consider their situation as unfair are mainly the less
talented employees.
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Our theoretical model offers a possible explanation for those observations which is based on
the interplay between employees’ fairness concerns and labor donations. Our analysis suggests
that the ability of mission-oriented employers to extract labor donations from their most pro-
ductive employees is undermined by workers’ fairness concerns. This is particularly the case
when the workers’ ability is not observable so that screening contracts must be designed. In
her attempt to maximize labor donations from the most talented workers, the employer is lim-
ited by the ‘envy rent’ necessary to compensate the lower net-earners and by the information
rent to be paid to high-ability employees. Our model shows that optimal contracts are sub-
stantially shaped by the relevance of the organization’s mission. Specifically, the ‘envy at the
top’ solution observed in Public Administration, Defense, Education, and Health Care would
emerge because labor donations in those sectors are high and are only partially offset by the
‘envy’ and information rents paid to the most talented workers. Optimal screening contracts
are such that the most talented workers are the lower net-earners and must be compensated for
being envious. Instead, the ‘envy at the bottom’ solution observed in the Trade sector would
emerge because labor donations in that sector are low and are partially or totally offset by the
information rents paid to high-ability workers. Optimal contracts now entail an ‘envy rent’
for the less-talented employees who are dissatisfied of being the lower net-earner. Through the
screening mechanism such ‘envy rent’ is also appropriated by the most talented workers, whose
compensation increases even more.
The difficult trade-off between preserving a perception of fairness in the workplace and re-
warding the most talented workers has been investigated before in the case of standard firms.
Our paper complements previous works by analyzing the issue from the perspective of a mission-
oriented organization willing to extract labor donations from high-performer employees. Our
model and the related empirical evidence emphasize that the most talented employees may
suffer some disutility loss because of envy in organizations whose mission is important. von
Siemens (2011) has already shown that firms can use both contractual and organizational mea-
sures to reduce the costs arising from workers’ social preferences. We contribute to the debate
on fairness in the workplace suggesting that non-monetary rewards may become particularly
important in mission-oriented organizations confronted with motivated workers. Specifically,
the organization could increase attention towards its employees by adopting strategies as, for
example, recognition and delegation which may effectively complement traditional monetary
incentives used to screen workers (see Bradler et al., 2016, and De Chiara and Manna, 2016, for
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models investigating recognition and delegation, respectively).
To dig the problem further, some assumptions are worth relaxing. First, maintaining the
monopsonist framework of the present model, it would be interesting either to introduce het-
erogeneity in workers’ adherence to the firm’s mission (i.e. in workers’ motivation) or to let
the organization design its mission together with the screening contracts. Second, competition
among organizations could be considered; for example in a setting with two organizations char-
acterized by different missions that compete to attract the most talented workers. We leave
those issues for future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Full information with mission but no fairness concerns
This is the instance producing the largest surplus. When β = 0 the optimal contracts are such
that eL < eH and ωL < ωH and write
eH = 1 + γ, eL =
1+γ
θ ,
ωH =
1−γ2
2 , ωL =
1−γ2
2θ .
(19)
Given that fairness concerns have no bite here, the unique solution entails NL > NH . Specifi-
cally, net compensations are:
NH = −γeH and NL = −γeL, (20)
so that the difference between labor donations is here the highest as possible.
Notice that the assumption 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 implies that labor donation is sufficiently low to
prevent motivated workers from receiving a negative wage when β = 0. In addition, given our
interpretation of the effort cost as the monetary equivalent of a physical or psychological cost,
limited liability is assured.
A.2 Full information with fairness concerns but no mission
When employees care about fairness, but the firm has no-mission (γ = 0), the employer sets
NH = NL = 0 and no worker suffers from envy. Optimal contracts are
eH = 1, eL =
1
θ ,
ωH =
1
2 , ωL =
1
2θ .
In words, when fairness concerns are relevant but the firm has no-mission, the employer opti-
mally prevents envy by setting the workers’ participation constraints to zero. However, the firm
cannot take advantage of labor donation.
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A.3 Full information with labor donation and fairness concerns
Suppose that NH > NL, then workers’ utilities are:
UH = ωH − 12e2H + γeH ,
UL = ωL − 12θe2L + γeL − β(NH −NL).
The principal maximizes her expected profits fixing UL = UH = 0. The wages are:
ωH =
1
2e
2
H − γeH ,
ωL =
1
2θe
2
L − γeL + β(NH −NL).
Substituting NL and NH in ωL and rearranging:
ωH =
1
2e
2
H − γeH ,
ωL =
1
2θe
2
L − γ
(
1
1+β eL +
β
1+β eH
)
.
So that
NH = −γeH and NL = −γ
(
1
1+β eL +
β
1+β eH
)
.
Hence, NH > NL requires −γeH > −γ
(
1
1+β eL +
β
1+β eH
)
, which can be rewritten as eL > eH .
The previous inequality will be checked later on.
Substituting the wages into the principal’s maximization problem we obtain:
pi = λ
[
eH − 1
2
e2H + γeH
]
+ (1− λ)
[
eL − 1
2
θe2L + γ
(
1
1 + β
eL +
β
1 + β
eH
)]
.
First order conditions with respect to effort levels are:
∂pi
∂eH
: λ(1− eH + γ) + (1− λ)
(
β
1+βγ
)
= 0 ⇔ eH = 1+γ1 +
(
1−λ
λ
) ( β
1+β
)
γ;
∂pi
∂eL
: 1− θeL + γ1+β = 0 ⇔ eL = 1θ + γθ(1+β) .
(21)
One can easily check that those effort levels are not consistent with the condition eL > eH . As
a consequence, we discard the solution with NH > NL.
Suppose now that NH < NL. Workers’ utilities are:
UH = ωH − 12e2H + γeH − β(NL −NH),
UL = ωL − 12θe2L + γeL.
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Imposing UL = UH = 0, the wages are:
ωH =
1
2e
2
H − γeH + β(NL −NH),
ωL =
1
2θe
2
L − γeL.
Substituting the expressions for NL and for NH in ωH and rearranging:
NH = −γ
(
1
1+β eH +
β
1+β eL
)
and NL = −γeL.
From the expressions above, one can easily check that 0 > NL > NH if and only if eH > eL,
which will be checked ex-post.
We can now substitute the wages into the expected profits of the principal:
pi = λ
[
eH − 1
2
e2H + γ
(
1
1 + β
eH +
β
1 + β
eL
)]
+ (1− λ)
[
eL − 1
2
θe2L + γeL
]
.
First order conditions with respect to the effort levels are:
∂pi
∂eH
: λ
[
1− eH + γ
1 + β
]
= 0 ⇔ eH = 1 + γ
1 + β
∂pi
∂eL
: λ
[
β
1 + β
γ
]
+ (1− λ) [1− θeL + γ] = 0 ⇔ eL = 1
θ
+
γ
θ
[
1 +
(
λ
1− λ
)(
β
1 + β
)]
Substituting those optimal efforts level in the condition eH > eL, we obtain Condition 1 stated
in the main text.
Finally, when Condition 1 is not satisfied, then the firm optimally sets eH = eL = e⇔ NL =
NH . Then, the wages are:
ωL =
1
2θe
2 − γe and ωH = 12e2 − γe, withωH < ωL.
Substituting the previous wages into the firm’s maximization problem, we obtain:
pi = λ
[
e− 1
2
e2 + γe
]
+ (1− λ)
[
e− 1
2
θe2 + γe
]
,
which gives:
∂pi
∂e
: λ(1 + γ − e) + (1− λ)(1 + γ − θe) = 0 ⇔ e = 1 + γ
λ+ (1− λ)θ .
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A.4 Feasible solutions with screening
Depending on the ordering of net compensations of truthfully reporters and mimickers, we can
distinguish between 6 different instances (see Table 8) which, in turn, generate three classes of
solutions. In particular, from Case 1 we can derive the class of solutions such that NL > NH ,
from Cases 1 and 6 we can derive the class of solutions such that NL = NH , finally, from Cases
from 2 to 6 we can derive the class of solutions such that NL < NH . Each possible class of
solutions will be feasible in a specific region of the parameters. Given that the single crossing
condition is not satisfied in our framework, multiple solutions are in principle possible for each
of the cases listed in Table 8, depending on the binding constraints. Even if the number of
solutions is potentially large, only four solutions turn out to be feasible.
Cases Conditions
Case 1 NˆL > NL ≥ NH > NˆH
Case 2 NH > NˆH ≥ NˆL > NL
Case 3 NH > NˆL > NˆH > NL
Case 4 NˆL > NH > NˆH > NL
Case 5 NH > NˆL > NL > NˆH
Case 6 NˆL > NH ≥ NL > NˆH
Table 8: Depending on the ordering of net compensations of truthfully reporters and mimickers,
We can distinguish between 6 different cases.
Specifically, one can show that, in Case 1, only two solutions are possible: (i) the one such
that NL > NH and constraints ICH and PCL are both binding (presented in Subsection 5.1
in the main text) and (ii) the solution such that NL = NH and constraint ICH is binding
(presented in Subsection 5.2). Cases 2 and 3 turn out to be equivalent, the only possible
solution here entails NL < NH and constraints ICH and PCL are both binding (this solution
is presented in Subsection 5.3). Finally, one can show that solutions derived in Cases 4, 5 and
6 are not feasible and must be discarded. We also derive the pooling solution that necessarily
entails envy at the bottom and is thus presented as a subsection of Subsection 5.3 (specifically,
Subsection 5.3.1).
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A.5 Screening contracts with ‘envy at the top’
Let us consider Case 1 of Table 8: NˆL > NL > NH > NˆH . We can rewrite the participation
and incentive constraints in the following way:
ωL − θ
2
e2L + γeL ≥ 0 (PCL)
ωH − 1
2
e2H + γeH − β(NL −NH) ≥ 0 (PCH)
ωL − θ
2
e2L + γeL ≥ ωH −
θ
2
e2H + γeH − β(NL − NˆH) (ICL)
ωH − 1
2
e2H + γeH − β(NL −NH) ≥ ωL −
1
2
e2L + γeL (ICH)
Let us first derive the monotonicity condition. By adding the incentive constraints of the
two types of agents:
ωL− θ
2
e2L+γeL+ωH−
1
2
e2H+γeH−β(NL−NH) ≥ ωH−
θ
2
e2H+γeH−β(NL−NˆH)+ωL−
1
2
e2L+γeL
The previous condition can be rewritten as:
1
2
∆θ(e2H − e2L) + β(NH − NˆH) ≥ 0
or, similarly,
1
2
∆θe2H(1 + β)−
1
2
∆θe2L ≥ 0,
and rearranging we obtain:
eH ≥ eL√
1 + β
, (22)
i.e. a ‘weak’ monotonicity condition.
It is easy to show that the unique possible solution is such that ICH and PCL are binding.
If ICH and PCL bind, then
ωH − 1
2
e2H + γeH − β(NL −NH) =
1
2
θe2L − γeL −
1
2
1e2L + γeL,
which also implies
UH =
1
2
∆θe2L.
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Therefore, PCH is satisfied. We can now rewrite ICL as:
ωL ≥ 1
2
θe2L − γeL +
1
2
1e2H − γeH + β(NL −NH) +
1
2
∆θe2L −
1
2
θe2H + γeH − β(NL −NH)
ωL ≥ 1
2
θe2L − γeL −
1
2
∆θ(e2H(1 + β)− e2L)
UL ≥ −1
2
∆θ[e2H(1 + β)− e2L].
Hence also ICL is satisfied. We can then conclude that, when ICH and PCL are binding, PCH
and ICL are also satisfied.
From ICH and PCL binding, one can derive the expressions for the wages that are reported
in (6) and (5) in the main text. Substituting the wages into the firm’s maximization problem,
we obtain the following expression for the employer’s profits:
pi = λ
[
eH −
(
1
2
e2H − γ
[
β
1 + β
eL +
1
1 + β
eH
]
+
1
2
∆θe2L
)]
+ (1− λ)
[
eL −
(
1
2
θe2L − γeL
)]
.
First order conditions are:
∂pi
∂eH
: λ
(
1− eH + γ
1 + β
)
= 0 ⇔ eTH = 1 +
γ
1 + β
∂pi
∂eL
: λ
(
β
1 + β
γ − 1
1 + β
∆θeL
)
+(1−λ)(1−θeL+γ) = 0 ⇔ eTL =
λβγ + (1− λ)(1 + γ)(1 + β)
∆θλ+ (1− λ)(1 + β)θ
A.6 Screening with ‘envy-free’ contracts
The ‘envy-free’ solution is obtained from Case 1 of Table 8 by imposing that NL = NH . We
thus have NˆL > NL = NH > NˆH . The incentive and participation constraints can be rewritten
as:
ωL − θ
2
e2L + γeL ≥ 0
ωH − 1
2
e2H + γeH ≥ 0
ωL − θ
2
e2L + γeL ≥ ωH −
θ
2
e2H + γeH − β(NL − NˆH)
ωH − 1
2
e2H + γeH ≥ ωL −
1
2
e2L + γeL
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where NL = NH implies that ωH − 12e2H = ωL − θ2e2L or that:
ωH − ωL = 1
2
e2H −
θ
2
e2L. (23)
One can show that the only incentive compatible solution is the one such that the incentive
constraint for the high-ability employees is binding, implying that:
ωH − 1
2
e2H + γeH = ωL −
1
2
e2L + γeL. (24)
Substituting (23) into (24) we obtain condition (10) in the main text.
One can check that condition (10) is verified when NL = NH = 0 or when net compensations
are both zero. Specifically, it must be ωH− 12e2H = ωL− θ2e2L = 0. Hence ωH = ωL and 12e2H = θ2e2L
must hold, which implies that eH = eL
√
θ. Substituting eH = eL
√
θ into 12e
2
H − θ2e2L = 0 we
obtain expression (11) in the main text. Substituting the effort levels into equation ωH− 12e2H =
ωL − θ2e2L = 0 we obtain the wage rate ωF .
A.7 Screening contracts with ‘envy at the bottom’
In both Cases 2 and 3 of Table 8, the incentive and participation constraints writes:
ωL − θ
2
e2L + γeL − β(NH −NL) ≥ 0 (PCL)
ωH − 1
2
e2H + γeH ≥ 0 (PCH)
ωL − θ
2
e2L + γeL − β(NH −NL) ≥ ωH −
θ
2
e2H + γeH (ICL)
ωH − 1
2
e2H + γeH ≥ ωL −
1
2
e2L + γeL − β(NH − NˆL) (ICH)
Let us consider the implementability condition. By adding the two incentive constraints:
ωL− θ
2
e2L+γeL−β(NH−NL)+ωH−
1
2
e2H+γeH ≥ ωH−
θ
2
e2H+γeH+ωL−
1
2
e2L+γeL−β(NH−NL),
which can be rewritten as:
1
2
∆θ(e2H − e2L) ≥ β(NH −NL). (25)
Let us consider that PCL and ICH are both binding. We report wages in expressions (13) and
(12) of the main text.
Here we show that, when PCL and ICH are binding, PCH and ICL are satisfied as well.
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The participation constraint of the efficient type is satisfied if:
ωH ≥ 1
2
e2H − γeH
substituting wage ωH :
1
2
e2H − γeH +
1
2
∆θe2L(1 + β) ≥
1
2
e2H − γeH
or
1
2
∆θe2L(1 + β) > 0.
Therefore, PCH is satisfied. We can rewrite ICL as:
ωL ≥ 1
2
θe2L − γeL + β(NH −NL) +
1
2
e2H +
1
2
∆θe2L(1 + β)−
1
2
θe2H .
Substituting wage ωL, the previous inequality can be rewritten as:
1
2
θe2L − γeL + β(NH −NL) ≥
1
2
θe2L − γeL + β(NH −NL) +
1
2
e2H +
1
2
∆θe2L(1 + β)−
1
2
θe2H .
After some simple computations, we find that
1
2
∆θe2H ≥
1
2
∆θe2L(1 + β) ⇔ eH ≥ eL
√
1 + β.
Hence ICL is satisfied from the implementability condition.
Substituting expressions (13) and (12) for the wages into the employer’s profits:
max
eL,eH
pi =λ
[
eH −
(
1
2
θe2H − γeH +
1
2
∆θe2L(1 + β)
)]
+
+ (1− λ)
[
eL −
(
θ
2
e2L − γ
(
1
1 + β
eL +
β
1 + β
eH
)
+
β
2
∆θe2L
)]
First order conditions with respect to the effort levels are:
∂pi
∂eH
: λ[1− eH + γ] + (1− γ)
(
β
1 + β
γ
)
= 0 ⇔ eBH = 1 + γ + γ
1− λ
λ
β
1 + β
.
∂pi
∂eL
:− λ[∆θ(1 + β)eL] + (1− λ)
[
1 +
γ
1 + β
− (θeL + β∆θeL)
]
= 0 ⇔
eBL =
(1− λ)(1 + β + γ)
(1 + β)[λ∆θ(1 + β) + (1− λ)(θ + β∆θ)]
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A.7.1 Pooling contracts
A pooling contract entails eH = eL = e
P and ωH = ωL = ω
P . Given that low-ability types
provide effort at a higher cost and, as a result, receive a lower net compensation, we are here
in a case of ‘envy at the bottom’. The participation constraint of low-ability types binds when:
ωP − θ
2
(
eP
)2
+ γeP − β(NH −NL) = 0.
This assures that both types are willing to accept the contract. Now, since the difference between
net compensations NH −NL is equal to 12∆θ
(
eP
)2
, we can rewrite the previous equation as:
ωP =
1
2
θ
(
eP
)2 − γeP + 1
2
β∆θ
(
eP
)2
(26)
Substituting ωP into the profit function, we obtain the following expression:
piP = λ
[
eP −
(
1
2
θ
(
eP
)2 − γeP + 1
2
β∆θ
(
eP
)2)]
+(1−λ)
[
eP −
(
1
2
θ
(
eP
)2 − γeP + 1
2
β∆θ
(
eP
)2)]
The first-order condition with respect to eP is:
∂pi
∂eP
= 1− θeP + γ − β∆θeP = 0 ⇔ eP = 1 + γ
β∆θ + θ
.
Substituting the effort eP into (26), we obtain the wage rate ωP in (18).
B Robustness Checks
In this section, we study two robustness checks for the empirical analysis. In particular, we first
test Prediction 2 by excluding civil servants. Then, we replicate our analysis by using the 2009
wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel.
Civil Servants. To test Prediction 2, we have considered the Public Services Sector where
labor donation is relevant and we have found that our theoretical prediction is confirmed. A
possible objection is that in the health-care and education sector many employees are civil
servants working in (public or non-profit) organizations that not necessarily maximize profits.
To address such objection we performed our analysis excluding civil servants from the dataset
and we checked that our results are still satisfied. In Table 9, we repeat the analysis provided
in Table 6 without civil servants. The coefficients of ability have the negative sign and are
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statistically significant. For a one unity increase in the scale of ability the odds of fair income
versus no fair income are 0.83 times lower, given all other variables constant. The level of
education continues to impact negatively on the employees’ fairness concerns, while the other
independent variables are not statistically significant.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fairness Logit Odds Ratio Logit Odds Ratio
Ability -0.19*** 0.83*** -0.19*** 0.83***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.075 0.93
(0.598) (0.598)
Age 0.003 1.00
(0.649) (0.649)
Higher -0.48** 0.62**
(0.023) (0.023)
White-collar -0.11 0.89
(0.448) (0.448)
Observations 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 9: Prediction 2. We consider the Public Services sector but we exclude from this sample
civil servants employees. The table reports the coefficients and odds ratio of the Logit model.
While Columns 1 and 2 only consider our measure of ability and control for the employees’
occupation, Columns 3 and 4 consider all the independent variables. P-values are reported in
parentheses. In all regressions, standard errors are clustered at NACE 2-digit level. *** Denotes
significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
2009 Wave. We repeat our analysis considering the 2009 wave of the dataset and we report
results for Predictions 2 and 3. In total, 10,434 individuals responded to the questions on
fairness, ability, and those regarding the controls. We consider all individuals who were fully
employed or worked part time, but we exclude apprentices and those who did not provide an
answer. Interestingly, in the 2009 wave we can also control for the size of the organization. In
all regressions, we cluster standard errors at NACE 2-digit level but the results are robust if we
cluster them at the occupation level. When we only consider the Public Services sector, there
is a total of 3,122 individuals who responded the questions. In this sector, the most part of
46
employees are women (66% against the 34% of men). While almost the 50% of men holds a
university degree, only the 37% of the women does. The average age is 43 years.25
In Table 10 we report the coefficients and the odds ratio of the Logit regression for the
public services sector.26 While Columns 1 and 2 only consider ability and control for size and
occupation, Columns 3 and 4 consider all the independent variables. P-values are reported in
parentheses. All results are in line with those reported in the main text. More specifically, the
coefficients of ability have the negative sign and are statistically significant in the Public Service
Sector.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fairness Logit Odds Ratio Logit Odds Ratio
Ability -0.15** 0.861** -0.14** 0.87**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.042) (0.042)
Male 0.00 1.00
(0.998) (0.998)
Age 0.003 1.00
(0.687) (0.687)
Education -0.055 0.957
(0.206) (0.206)
White-collar -0.37*** 0.689***
(0.005) (0.005)
Observations 3,122 3,122 3,122 3,122
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 10: The table reports the coefficients of the Logit and Probit regressions. While Columns
1 and 2 only consider our measure of ability and control for size and occupation, Columns 3 and
4 consider all the independent variables. P-values are reported in parentheses. In all regressions,
standard errors are clustered at NACE 2-digit level. ***Denotes significance at the 1 percent
level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
To provide an interpretation of the magnitude of the effects, we report the odds ratio of
the Logit model (columns 2 and 4). We find that for a one unit increase in the scale of ability
the odds of fair income versus no fair income are 0.86 (0.87) times lower, given all the other
25Notice that the descriptive statics are similar to those observed in the 2005 wave.
26Results are confirmed with a probit model.
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variables constant. Prediction 2 is confirmed: high-ability employees perceive their wage as
unfair more often than low-ability employees in the sector where labor donation is important.
To test Prediction 3, we study the impact of the employees’ perceived ability on fairness
considerations in the other sectors. We find that, irrespective of the sector that we analyze, the
effect is never statistically significant.
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